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“And Yet It Moves”—                                 
The First Amendment and Certainty 
by RONALD K.L. COLLINS* 
Abstract 
 
  Surprisingly few, if any, works on the First Amendment have 
explored the relation between free speech and certainty.  The same 
holds true for decisional law.  While this relationship is inherent in 
much free speech theory and doctrine, its treatment has nonetheless 
been rather opaque.  In what follows, the author teases out—
philosophically, textually, and operationally—the significance of that 
relationship and what it means for our First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  In the process, he examines how the First Amendment 
operates to counter claims of certainty and likewise how it is employed 
to demand a degree of certainty from those who wish to cabin free 
speech rights.  Drawing its satirical title from words purportedly 
spoken by Galileo when he was persecuted by ecclesiastical 
inquisitors for defending the heliocentric theory of Copernicus, the 
Essay argues that many free speech theories (from Milton to 
Meiklejohn and beyond) have the net effect of constricting our First 
Amendment freedoms based on uncertain claims to normative benefits 
and equally uncertain claims of societal harm.  In this general sense, 
many free speech theorists might be viewed as the descendants (albeit 
kinder ones) of Galileo’s ecclesiastical detractors insofar as they 
invoke their own certainty of morals (or normative theories) or alleged 
harms to trump actual facts in order to censor speech.  This problem 
is compounded when First Amendment lawyers must disingenuously 
pigeonhole their client’s speech into the doctrinal boxes compatible 
with normative theories.  In the duplicitous course of things, bawdy 
comedy becomes political action, erotic sexual expression becomes 
self-realization, offensive speech becomes cultural criticism, and 
imagistic commercial expression becomes consumer information.  
Strange as it is, in such circumstances falsity is necessarily called into 
 
 *  Harold S. Shefelman Scholar, University of Washington, School of Law.  I happily 
acknowledge the thoughtful comments offered by my friend and colleague, David Skover, and 
likewise thank Tricia Wolf for her help. 
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the service of placing a normative face on aberrant expression.  By 
way of a bold counter to all such theories, and duly mindful of the role 
of real harm in the working scheme of things, the author advances a 
view of the First Amendment premised less on certainty (and its 
conceptual cousin, normativity) than on risk—real and substantial 
risks, properly comprehended.  Thus understood, the very idea of risk 
deserves to be an accepted and preferred part of the calculus of 
decision-making, be it judicial, legislative or executive.  Hence, at the 
philosophical level, a risk-free First Amendment is a contradiction 
while at the operational level it is a formula for suppression.  
Undaunted by the specter of criticism of his own experimental views 
on the matter, the author invites the kind of First Amendment risk-
taking once roundly championed by Justice Louis Brandeis—a brand 
of freedom though uncertain of its success is nevertheless hopeful of 
its attainment.   
 
They command the earth to stand still, less 
their possessions be endangered, and their 
peasants begin to think new thoughts. 
                                          – Bertolt Brecht1 
 
Certainty is the servant of the censor. 
 
That proposition, of course, cannot be canonical without being ironical.  
Still, it is close enough to whatever is the mark by which we evaluate ideas.  
Think of it: On April 12, 1633, when Galileo Galilei was brought before his 
ecclesiastical inquisitors for defending the heliocentric theory of Copernicus, 
the grand defenders of the Holy Apostolic Truth were certain of his religious 
heresy and his scientific error.  The secular science he proffered in his 
Dialogue on the Great World Systems (1632)2 did not square with 
Ecclesiastical Truth.  Hence, he was tried.  Later, after he was convicted and  
facing the specter of prison,3 the Italian astronomer and philosopher 
reluctantly recanted and mouthed the words of a humiliating abjuration to 
the General Inquisitors against Heretical Depravity.4  Legend has it that 
somewhere along the way Galileo muttered a dissident phrase, “Eppur si 
 
 1.  FREDERIC EWEN, BERTOLT BRECHT: HIS LIFE, HIS ART, HIS TIMES 335 (1992) (quoting 
files from BRECHT ARCHIVES & WERNER MITTENZWEI, BERTOLT BRECHT: VON DER 
MASSNAHME ZU LEBEN DES GALILEO). 
 2.  Since Galileo wrote his work in Italian, rather than in the customary scholarly Latin, it 
was far more accessible to lay readers of the time and thus more dangerous to the Church.  See 
BENÉT’S READER’S ENCYCLOPEDIA 381 (4th ed. 1996). 
 3.  See THE TRIAL OF GALILEO 1612-1633, 189–93 (Thomas F. Mayer ed., 2012). 
 4.  Id. at 194. 
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muove!” (“And yet it moves”).5  Meanwhile, the decree of the 
Congregation of the Index6 prevailed whereupon purist certainty returned 
to the bloody land. 
Galileo did not follow the example of Socrates, who was forced to 
swallow the noxious certainty of his Athenian detractors.  Facts aside, they, 
too, were convinced of the true identity of their gods and the Secret and 
Sacred Truths they espoused.7  So it has been for centuries, no matter the 
nation, creed, or ideology.  What well-functioning tyrannies and 
malfunctioning democracies have in common is some abiding commitment 
to certainty of one form or another.  At some pinpoint in conceptual time, 
the former implodes into the latter, though it may take years to detect and 
even longer to concede.  But by then it is too late, for certainty has taken its 
tragic toll.  Oh, the evils that have been and continue to be committed—lives 
taken, torture inflicted, liberty deprived, and reputations smeared—in 
Certainty’s name. 
To say that one is certain is to say that something is beyond doubt; it is 
to say, for example, that the question under consideration is settled—it does 
not move anymore.  “Moral certainty” adds an ethical or spiritual dollop of 
finality to the matter; it stills the need for discussion even more.  In their 
unadulterated forms, monism, purism, absolutism, originalism, textualism, 
communism, liberalism, conservatism, atheism, and almost every other kind 
of-ism is akin to moral certainty—they are its secular cousins.  Where such 
isms rule over the minds of men and the wills of women,8 there is little room, 
if any, for movement in the opposite direction.  Censorship by the 
government’s formal decree or a group’s informal directive is the inevitable 
result.  Of course, the censor—even in the most tyrannical of regimes—
always invokes some justification, “higher good,” or norm to rationalize or 
legitimize enforced silence.  But whatever the justification, the followers of 
the Congregation of the Index demand their way. 
 
 5.  See ANDREA FROVA & MARIAPIERA MARENZANA, THUS SPOKE GALILEO: THE GREAT 
SCIENTIST’S IDEAS AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO THE PRESENT DAY 464 (1998).  See also HANS C. 
OHANIAN, EINSTEIN’S MISTAKES: THE HUMAN FAILINGS OF GENIUS 37 (2008). 
 6.  This was a decree issued in 1616 by the Sacred Congregation of the Index condemning 
the Copernican theory of heliocentricity.  See JEROME J. LANGFORD, GALILEO, SCIENCE, AND THE 
CHURCH 86–104 (3d ed. 2003). 
 7.  See JOSIAH OBER, SOCRATES AND DEMOCRATIC ATHENS, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO SOCRATES 141–48 (Donald L. Morrison ed., 2011). 
 8.  Simone Weil offered a remarkably insightful discussion of this general point in a 
powerful 1937 essay.  See SIMONE WEIL, SELECTED ESSAYS, 1934–43 at 154, 156–65 (Richard 
Rhees trans., 1962).  See GABRIELLA FIORI, SIMONE WEIL: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 149–
54 (Joseph R. Berrigan trans., 1989) (discussing the context in which this famous essay was 
penned).  
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Aspirationally, the secular “gospel” of the First Amendment, by 
contrast, stays the censorial hand in ending discourse.  As here understood, 
the Madisonian principle operates to move the vagaries of dialogue further 
along.  In this sense, it is no faithful respecter of Truth with a capital T.  
Likewise, it is a foe to the dogmas of certitude preached by the Paters of Ism.  
Rather, the free speech frame of mind to which I refer invites Socratic gadfly 
types back into the city of dialogue from whence they were driven out.  In 
other words, it allows the gods of the city to be challenged and the circularity 
of the heliocentricity of the sun to be defended.  It leaves omniscience to the 
gods and everything short of that to mortals with enough will and 
determination to push Sisyphean stones. 
Seen in this light, the First Amendment both humbles and irritates us.  
It begs the nagging question, and then again, almost ad infinitum.  In various 
ways—political and apolitical, civil and uncivil, scientific and unscientific, 
religious and secular—this way of acting disparages Darwin (and his critics), 
derides Derrida (and his opponents), and dismisses even the teachings of the 
great Dalai Lama (and his detractors).  Why?  There are many answers, but 
let me tender one, if only for preliminary consideration and examination. 
Start here: Truth might well be viewed more as a verb than a noun, more 
as a process than an end, and more incomplete than complete.  Granted, 
gravity makes its demands and cancer conquers many a cell.  But in the long 
run how we as humans come to understand such things is more an evolving 
cerebral matter than a static scientific truth.  Viewed in categorical terms, 
Darwin’s theory of evolution may now in some measure seem uncertain 
because it was incomplete; it stopped the truth process before the discovery 
of the double-helix structure of DNA.9  We pay a price for certainty.  
Moreover, certainty has a way of becoming uncertain over time—the texture 
of truth never feels quite the same as one generation after another touches it. 
Process (I do not say progress) is not a one-way ratchet.  It does not 
always wrench towards truth, or improve life for the better, or explain things 
satisfactorily, or make the world more just, or more democratic, or more 
egalitarian, or coincide with our norms.  Process, qua process, is indifferent 
to such values.  It is no more normative than a hammer.  To extend the 
metaphor, if in the name of the First Amendment we allow people to use 
such tools, we do so more in the blind hope that the resulting product will be 
more constructive than destructive.  But who can be sure of how such matters 
 
 9.  See RICHARD WILLIAM NELSON, DARWIN, THEN AND NOW: THE MOST AMAZING 
STORY IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 274 (2009) (“The discovery of [the double helix] was 
monumental.  Now that the actual structure of genetic information had been discovered, the 
mysterious events of evolution were open for further molecular investigation.”)  See generally, 
JAMES SCHWARTZ, IN PURSUIT OF THE GENE: FROM DARWIN TO DNA (2010). 
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will play out?  By that calculus, this belief in the First Amendment asks us 
to trade certainty for contingency, and this with the uncertain expectation 
that something good may come of all of this.  Those who oppose this 
contingent mindset often demand that the rest of us yield to their Truths, that 
we abandon our uncertainties in the name of their convictions, and that we 
carve out ever more and more exceptions to the First Amendment, if only to 
make way for the norms which they are certain are central to any just society 
(or, should I say, to their view of such a society). 
All too often Truth tumbles with hubris, with that smug audacity so 
confident of itself that it stands alone in the corner of the courtyard, 
deliberately distanced from the place where real ideas are exchanged.  Its 
nemesis is a humility born of doubt about one’s own grasp of things, both 
epistemological and moral.  “We have made enough mistakes along the 
way,” Albert Camus once warned, “to be able to benefit from the lessons that 
failure always has to teach.”10  How true.  The benefits of failure, it should 
be noticed, come after the fact, after the proverbial damage has been done.  
Take, for example, the Pentagon Papers case,11 in which the government 
maintained that national security would be compromised and jeopardized if 
the leaks Daniel Elsberg orchestrated and the Washington Post and New York 
Times sought to publish were made public.12  As it turned out, the 
government’s claim was exaggerated and unfounded.13  Thus, had the Court 
ruled other than it did, it would have sided with the “Government’s Truth” 
leaving the country to learn “from the lessons that failure has to teach.” 
By contrast, the First Amendment as portrayed herein14 moves in the 
opposite direction.  It prefers humility to hubris,15 dialogue to censorship, 
correction to certainty, some uncomfortable chaos to lockstep conformity, 
and the free flow of information to brash claims of secrecy, at least when 
there is no real, substantial, and imminent harm to be suffered.  By that 
measure, such a First Amendment mindset is a modest one, a mind open to 
the actual possibility that it might be wrong in its claims of Truth, in its 
 
 10.  ALBERT CAMUS, ALGERIAN CHRONICLES 70 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Alice Kaplan 
ed., 2013). 
 11.  New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 12.  See FLOYD ABRAMS, FRIEND OF THE COURT: ON THE FRONT LINES WITH THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 138–39, 382–83, 392 (2013). 
 13.  Id. at 135–54. 
 14.  When I speak of “the First Amendment” in this way, I do not mean to invoke a Deus ex 
Machina argument premised on an abstraction that is personified.  Rather, I mean to refer to a 
general mindset consistent with the arguments advanced in this Essay. 
 15.  Of course, the First Amendment likewise has its bolder, passionate side, which is one of 
its main features.  Even there, however, a certain degree of skepticism is warranted.  See infra notes 
85–88 and accompanying text. 
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assessment of the societal worth of a given form of expression, in its 
democratic calculation, in its moral evaluation, in its aesthetic judgment, or 
simply wrong in its starting premises.  Such a view of things, of course, is 
not a cure all.  It is rather a process that, in the democratic scheme of things, 
errs on the side of more expression not less, if only because it aspires to teach 
us all a few lessons this side of failure. 
 
As it turned out, Galileo, the old heretic, may have had it right, the 
canonical crowd be damned.  From that vantage point, the new heretics are 
the ones who preach the old dogma of the Congregation of the Index.  Of 
course, in modern times (at least here in Western world), they are more 
inclined to leave some heretics to their contrarian ways and do not subject 
them to the rack, wheel, or the garrote.  Why?  Because their unbelief does 
not really challenge societal certainty in any ways that actually offend us, or 
that destabilize the world we have come to accept.  Their uncertainty is 
relatively harmless.  Case in point: No one lost much sleep when Pluto was 
removed from the celestial maps since it really did not upset the axis around 
which our daily lives and belief systems rotate. 
So far as the principle of free expression is concerned, the matter of 
certainty also cuts in other directions.  That is, sometimes expression is 
abridged because those who would have the government do so are not 
entirely certain of the stability of their own creed or ideology.  Nonetheless, 
they want their creed (however diplomatically branded or craftily couched) 
to prevail.  Since their certainty is fragile it is in need of protection, which is 
the point at which the idea of censorship sets it.  Insecurity, too, beckons the 
censorial hand.  If you are unsure about the future of American values but 
you are certain they must triumph, then censor the expression of those who 
contest them—e.g., anarchists, Communists, antiwar protestors, 
environmentalists, feminists, Muslim sympathizers, advertisers, 
pornographers, for-profit corporations, and all sorts of other ideological and 
cultural rogues.  By that norm, they need to be kept at bay (for example, in 
those ironically tagged campus “free speech zones”).  Those uncertain of the 
viability of their beloved moral code will banish all expression that 
challenges it, as the history of Anthony Comstock (1844-1915) and the 
obscenity laws named after him so vividly demonstrate.  Comstock’s heirs 
will not allow the other world to turn with theirs; theirs is sole sexual truth 
of the moral universe.  In that universe, many a life and many a liberty 
sacrificed to save ears from hearing uncouth words or eyes from seeing the 
unholy sight of amorous bodies bonding intimately. 
There is a related kind of government uncertainty that arises in the 
context of digital information and those governmental and private actors who 
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regulate it.16  There, the specter of uncertainty so troubles the State’s quest 
for national security that it feels justified in engaging in questionable 
censorial practices, either direct or indirect, to provide it with a greater 
degree of purported certitude in matters such as ferreting out terrorists or 
identifying leakers of sensitive government information.  On the one hand, 
the government claims to be absolutely certain of the worthiness and 
necessity of its cause, both as to its objectives and methods.  On the other 
hand, it is uncertain about the precise magnitude of the threat posed by those 
it fears.  With this certitude of purpose, the government seeks to alleviate or 
significantly reduce the purported threats to our collective security.  To do 
this, it either coerces or coopts private entities, such as Internet service 
providers and search engine suppliers, to censor or monitor speech that it 
believes poses a threat to national security.17  While the context and method 
of the government’s censorial enterprise may be new, the forces that 
motivate it are not—perfect certainty as to the value of its goal and 
uncertainty as to the so-called danger posed by those who it believes seek to 
undermine that goal.  This is the caldron in which suppression is brewed.18 
The flip side of certainty is risk.  Understandably, we tend to be risk 
averse; we incline towards the safe side of the street.  What better statement 
of this proposition than Justice Robert Jackson’s eloquent dissent in 
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, wherein he warned: “There is danger that, if 
the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, 
it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”19  By a 
5-4 measure, the Court ignored Jackson’s counsel and sided with Arthur 
Terminiello, a Catholic priest who had a knack for being racially 
inflammatory, this while an unruly crowd protested outside the auditorium 
in which he spoke.  Though Jackson’s admonition was not heeded, his words 
have echoed down the halls of time and more recently have found a welcome 
ear in Judge Richard Posner.20  That said, it is helpful to bear in mind the 
 
 16.  See Derek Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 867–68, 872 (2012) 
(describing new kinds of censorship in digital age).  See generally, RONALD K.L. COLLINS & 
DAVID M. SKOVER, ROBOTICA: FREE SPEECH AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (forthcoming 2018) 
(discussing censorship in a robotized speech context). 
 17.  See Jack Balkin, Old School/New School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 
2298–99, 2308 (2014) (describing such methods of coercion and co-option). 
 18.  Of course, not all kinds of impermissible regulation of expression by the government 
constitute censorship per se.  See, e.g., id. at 2330 (referring to “pervasive digital surveillance”).  
Generally speaking, in this Essay I mean to be equally critical of such forms of government 
regulation as I am of government censorship. 
 19.  Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 20.  See RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF 
NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006). 
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view of the case for the other side, namely, that one need not laud suicide to 
endorse the proposition that the First Amendment, if it is to be meaningful, 
must allow for some degree of real risk.  After all, to contest “certainty” is 
to embrace risk. 
In bold terms, the oratorical cry of the First Amendment might be put 
thusly: The safe life is not worth living.  Time and again, from before the free 
speech jurisprudence of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissent in 
Abrams v. United States21 to and after that of Justice Stephen Breyer in his 
dissent in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,22 the idea of risk enters into 
the constitutional equation, as it must.  In that respect, Holmes’s hammer hit 
the nail right on its jurisprudential head: “[The Constitution] is an 
experiment, as all life is an experiment.”23  And experiments, including the 
free speech experiment in a democracy, can fail.  To permit experimentation 
is to risk failure and all that comes with it, including everything from racial 
or religious bigotry to socialist or capitalist tyranny.  Mindful of that, Justice 
Brandeis’ stirring words cannot be repeated too often: “Those who won our 
independence by revolution were not cowards.  They did not fear political 
change.  They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty.  [They were] 
courageous, self-reliant men, with [a] confidence in the power of free and 
fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular 
government . . . .”24 
Assuredly, to evoke passages such as the ones above is to play to the 
romantic side in us.  All right, fair enough.  I say that because I do not think 
that the First Amendment should be cabined in the quarters of risk-free or 
play-it-safe rationality or normativity.25  If anything, we are more in need of 
taking free-speech-chances than in refusing them in the name of some 
purported certainty, security, or morality.  After all, how sure is America of 
its liberty if it prosecutes newspaper printers such as Benjamin Bache?26  Or 
 
 21.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628–30 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Dean 
John Wigmore took strong issue with Holmes’s dissent and argued that such thinking could put the 
nation at undue and even perilous risk.  See THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES: A FREE SPEECH 
CHRONICLE AND READER 285–89 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2010) [hereinafter THE 
FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES].  
 22.  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40–62 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 23.  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 24.  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 25.  In this regard, I concede to having been somewhat influenced by my law school classmate 
and lifelong friend, Steve Shiffrin.  See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 
DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1993). 
 26.  See JEFFREY A. SMITH, FRANKLIN AND BACHE: ENVISIONING THE ENLIGHTENED 
REPUBLIC 83–163 (1990) (describing Bache’s criticism of Presidents Washington and Adams, 
Federalist lawmakers, and resulting prosecution of the Philadelphia printer). 
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if it jails comedians like Lenny Bruce?27  Or how self-confident is America 
in its morality if it silences the poetry of Allen Ginsberg’s “Howl”?28  Or 
how committed are we to free speech values when our Supreme Court 
countenances government retribution against prosecutors who publicly 
criticize the legitimacy of a search warrant?29  Or how sure are we liberals of 
our own liberality when we run abortion protestors out of public parks 
because their visual messages strike some of us as too horrific?30 The basic 
point is: When the government plays it too safe, it soon enough plays the 
card of the censor. 
In the more modern past, this mindset has taken refuge in many quarters 
of the liberal community, especially in the liberal legal academy.  It began 
in earnest at least twenty years ago when The Nation published an issue titled 
“Speech and Power”31 in which liberals, such as Owen Fiss, C. Edwin Baker, 
and Cass Sunstein, took aim at the protective side of our First Amendment 
jurisprudence as it applied to commercial speech, corporate speech, and 
campaign financing.  In other publishing venues, liberals such as Catharine 
MacKinnon targeted pornography.32  Today, much of the liberal ire is once 
again directed at hate speech.33  And why all this liberal animus against 
protecting speech rights?  The answer is, there is a perception that such 
 
 27.  See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE TRIALS OF LENNY BRUCE: THE 
FALL AND RISE OF AN AMERICAN ICON 267–313 (2002). 
 28.  See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, MANIA: THE STORY OF THE 
OUTRAGED AND OUTRAGEOUS LIVES THAT LAUNCHED A CULTURAL REVOLUTION 251–319, 347–
48 (2013).  Owing to current FCC indecency standards, “Howl” cannot be read during most waking 
hours on broadcast radio or television.  See Patricia Cohen, “Howl” in an Era That Fears 
Indecency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at E3 (describing unsuccessful effort to air “Howl” on 
broadcast radio). 
 29.  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).  In Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014), 
the Court did temper Garcetti a bit, at least in cases involving the potential of perjured testimony 
in a criminal case. 
 30.  See Adam Liptak, In Abortion Protests, Which to Protect, Children or Speech? N.Y. 
TIMES, May 13, 2013, at A13, and Emily Bazelon, The Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
Cowardice, SLATE (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/juris 
prudence/2013/08/gruesome_abortion_photos_and_the_supreme_court_the_justices_refuse_to_st
and.html. 
 31.  Speech and Power, 265 THE NATION 11 (July 21, 1997). 
 32.  See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993). 
 33.  See, e.g., MARI MATSUDA & CHARLES LAWRENCE III, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993), and K-Sue Park, The 
A.C.L.U. Needs to Rethink Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2017, at A23 (arguing the ACLU 
should “rethink how it understands free speech.  By insisting on a narrow reading of the First 
Amendment, the organization provides free legal support to hate-based causes.  More troubling, 
the legal gains on which the ACLU rests its colorblind logic have never secured real freedom or 
even safety for all.”).  See also Ronald K.L. Collins, Hate Speech Is Vile—And Protected, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2017 (discussing hate speech on college campuses). 
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protections place other liberal values (e.g., equality) in jeopardy.  In other 
words, when the risk factor entered the liberal tent, many of those who once 
defended it turned into the ones who sought to cabin it. 
The philosopher Heraclitus once quipped: “Nothing endures but 
change.”34  From a societal and cultural point of view, what makes 
Heraclitus’s axiom so problematic is that it wars with established norms 
about life and the afterlife and everything in between.  Insofar as First 
Amendment freedoms allow individuals to rail against the status quo and to 
rally for change, they too stand to be judged critically and even harshly.  The 
status quo is typically the status of society; in some foundational sense it is 
necessarily averse to change.  That is why Socrates (the individual) and 
philosophy (the pursuit) were seen as enemies of the state.  Viewed through 
that prism, the First Amendment represents the institutionalization of the 
Socratic way, though with far broader boundaries and far rougher edges.  If 
that is so, it is little wonder that when this nation was legally constituted its 
supreme law did not contain a First Amendment.  Pause, and think about it: 
If you are trying to forge a Union, you cannot really afford to have the Patrick 
Henry and George Mason bunch upset the constitutional applecart with 
endless criticisms and calls for change.  True, Article V of the Constitution 
of 1787 did allow for fundamental changes, but it made the process 
burdensome and supermajoritarian.  The First Amendment, by constitutional 
contrast, was a “quick fix.”  It permitted individuals to speak, print, petition, 
and even assemble for radical change, be it for religious liberty or political 
freedom or neither.  In other words, it allowed them to stir the political pot.  
But when a nation is new, when it is still constituting itself, it will be 
disinclined to be so open-minded as to risk its own perpetuation.  At that 
stage in its development, fear of change seems inevitable.  Politically 
speaking, it is amazing that the First Amendment ever became law, at least 
at such a tender point in our history.  What is not surprising, however, is the 
backlash that followed—the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which were 
all too predictable.  Most assuredly, the members of the Fifth Congress knew 
they were abridging speech.  They knew they were abridging the rights of 
the anti-federalists; and they knew that all of this was contrary to a 
constitutional amendment that had become the supreme law of the land only 
seven years earlier.  So why did they do it?  Fear.  They feared change; they 
feared exactly the kind of change that the First Amendment, if left 
unabridged, allowed the anti-federalists to call for. 
It should not be startling that in the history between 1791 and now, the 
First Amendment has been abridged countless times.  Why?  Because in a 
 
 34.  Quoted in 1 W. K. C. GUTHRIE, A HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY 435, 449–54 (1967). 
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very real sense it (by its very nature) poses a real danger to society.  And 
what is that danger?  CHANGE, or the prospect of it.  Lest we forget: “Every 
idea is an incitement.”35  And when people are incited to act, they sometimes 
change their ways.  Settled societies, however, dislike change.  They do not 
embrace what is different; they do not smile kindly on the outsider; and they 
certainly do not like to encourage Galileo types to rearrange their moral 
universe.  Strange as it must seem, the First Amendment calls on societies to 
be risk tolerant, which (if we are to be fair) is asking a lot.  If we but stop 
momentarily to dwell on it, our constitutional law as embodied in the First 
Amendment is squarely at odds with many of the basic precepts of the great 
political philosophers.  That law, faithfully applied, protects not only the 
modern-day Socrates (who was far more radical than typically understood) 
but also those whom Socrates condemned (such as the sophists).  Virtually 
all of exceptions to the First Amendment as crafted by the courts36 can be 
seen as attempts to rein in the radical world of the guaranty, a world where 
no settled idea or norm or belief is safe. 
If there is a lesson here (as with the one gleaned from the trial of 
Galileo), it is to be leery of those leery of change qua change.  Remember: 
The very idea of the First Amendment invites us to be open to change, or at 
least tolerant of it.  Think of it as that adversarial intellectual in the parlor or 
that badgering radical in the street who, with either refined dialect or course 
vernacular, contests much or all of what we hold morally, politically, and 
culturally dear.  If our system of free expression is working well, it will 
permit them to call for an end to some of the very things we are certain are 
vital to our continued existence as a civil and God-fearing society.  Writ 
large, the First Amendment calls on us to live with uncertainty, or some 
measure of it. 
While we need not be obstructionist Nihilists (note the capitalization), 
uncertainty, nonetheless, is a vital part of existence.  It contributes both to 
our evolutionary and philosophical bounty.  By that Camusian logic, the First 
Amendment, at least as herein portrayed, ventures to put that uncertainty to 
good use.  In that process, it neither endorses the canonical imperatives of 
the many nor the cynical imperatives of the nihilist few.  Justice Anthony 
Kennedy captured something of that idea well in the following observation: 
 
When a student first encounters our free speech jurisprudence, he or 
she might think it is influenced by the philosophy that one idea is as 
 
 35.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 36.  See Ronald K.L. Collins, The Roberts Court, the First Amendment, and the New 
Absolutism, 76 ALBANY L. REV. 409, 417–22 (2013) (listing forty-three exceptions to the First 
Amendment). 
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good as any other, and that in art and literature objective standards of 
style, taste, decorum, beauty, and esthetics are deemed by the 
Constitution to be inappropriate, indeed unattainable.  Quite the 
opposite is true.  The Constitution no more enforces a relativistic 
philosophy or moral nihilism than it does any other point of view.37 
 
Admittedly, there can be a fine line between a healthy Socratic-like 
skepticism and an unhealthy nihilist-like cynicism.  Even so, that possibility 
ought not to blind us to the ever-present need to test the imperatives of the 
adherents of both camps who argue with Aristotelian or Hegelian certainty 
about the certainty of their claims.  This is not a cause for Faustian angst so 
much as it is admonition to be skeptical of uncompromising skeptics. 
In light of this, the astute reader may well ask: But is not truth the 
benchmark of several key tenets of our free speech law, as, for example, in 
the law of fraud and defamation?  After all, when a man is lied to about the 
working condition of the transmission of a used car he purchased, it is no 
defense that the state of truth is so much in flux as to justify the swindler’s 
lie.  Likewise, when someone defames a good woman’s good reputation by 
way of knowing falsehoods, the one perpetuating the lie cannot take legal 
refuge in the nuances of deconstructionist arguments about truth.  Or what 
about the intentional lie told to a police officer in order to impede the 
administration of justice?  Are such lies immune from prosecution because 
of the philosopher’s reflective pause about the relationship between truth and 
certainty?  The answer to all of these queries is, of course, in the question 
itself.  Undoubtedly, we need some amount of perceived truth in order to live 
much of our daily lives. 
Still, if we step back and think of what is at really issue, it is not entirely 
clear that the demand for truth is what always drives the engine of free speech 
law.  That is, we demand truth (or our current perception of it) insofar as 
knowing falsehoods produce actual and significant harms to others.  Just 
consider the heralded opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan38 or the 
more recent ruling in Alvarez v. United States39—in both cases truth lost out 
to the liberty guaranteed by the First Amendment.  And why?  The answer 
inheres in a libertarian principle.  And harm is that principle.  If falsehoods—
e.g., exaggerations, puffery, white lies, or satirical swipes—produce no real 
 
 37.  United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). 
 38.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (allowing for certain kinds of 
defamation of public officials). 
 39.  Alvarez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (protecting certain kinds of false 
statements concerning Stolen Valor medals).  See also United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d. 666, 
666–77 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). 
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harm, or if they produce the kind of harm that is socially acceptable on 
balance, then their falsity is of little or no actual concern to us. 
 
Let me raise a few questions here: If some of those in the free speech 
community suffer from a kind of First Amendment hypertrophy, might it be 
that their First Amendment theories are so swollen with their own pet value-
laden norms that they fail to take sufficient account of the obvious?  Could 
it be that any perceived threat (no matter how real) to their prized norms (no 
matter how inflated) is enough for some to deny a free expression claim?  
That is, are some theories, some so norm-obsessed and value-inflated, that 
there is little breathing space for First Amendment freedom?  In such 
instances, could it be that the presence or likelihood of real harm, even if 
obliquely addressed, is discounted?40  Hence, if the harm factor, properly 
understood and applied, is what primarily fuels various free speech theories, 
then maybe more time and attention need to be focused on considering the 
typologies of harm.41 
Of course, harm is quite often linked to some norm.  Consider, for 
example, the proposition that pornography is harmful to women.  The norms 
to be safeguarded are equality and safety (as in a world safe from the rape 
“caused” by pornography, etc.).42  Such norms are offered up in categorical 
terms and thus in need of certain special kinds of protection.  The free speech 
problem, of course, is that once these norms and their conceptual offspring 
are let loose, they first circle and then fence in the domain of free speech—
they thus abridge that freedom of speech or of the press.  If the First 
Amendment is indeed the first freedom in our legal and philosophical 
scheme of rights, it may be owing to the fact that the idea behind it was to 
constitutionalize the risk factor and thus make it an indispensable part of all 
free expression analysis.  That is, wherever we may draw the harm line, some 
element of risk must remain.  And that measure of risk, if I may be so daring, 
must be meaningful and must expose us to some actual and present dangers.  
Again, life is an experiment and experiments fail.  This idea of meaningful 
risk—of taking real chances—is central if only because without it free 
expression could be abridged at the drop of a normative dime.  Holmes’s 
 
 40.  Notably, when such harm is absent, even malicious motives cannot defeat a First 
Amendment claim.  See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (upholding the right to 
demonstrate near military funeral). 
 41.  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81 
(2011); Frederick Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHICS 635 (1993). 
 42.  See infra notes 54–60 and accompanying text. 
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“experiment,”43 Brandeis’s “risks,”44 and Brennan’s echo of it all45 lead readily 
towards the path of contingency and away from the house of Certainty. 
Let us not speak falsely: If the First Amendment is to mean anything, it 
must mean that some actual and not insignificant degree of harm or offense 
or risk must be endured.  Otherwise, what is the point of such a constitutional 
guaranty if it protects only the speech or expression or ideas or principles or 
values of which a majority approves?  After all, it may be that offensive 
speech may cause civic disorder, that certain ideas will blossom into harmful 
practices, that expression is so close to abhorrent conduct that police action 
seems necessary, that particular types of expression are so vile and base as 
to degrade the norms of a civilized society, that expression amplified by 
technological advances if left largely unchecked will present heretofore 
insurmountable problems, that government secrets if made public might 
jeopardize our national security, and that hate speech will undermine our 
egalitarian ideals.  If the reflexive response to such understandable fears is 
censorship, then the real purpose of the First Amendment will become more 
ceremonial and less operational, and more made for a glorious graduation 
speech than for a needed judicial decision in defense of some moral leper or 
some political ranter run amok. 
I wonder if there can be any worthwhile interpretation of the First 
Amendment unless we first concede that risk (and that means the acceptance 
of some degree of genuine harm) is a vital part of the conceptual equation.  
There is more here than mere balancing, because insofar as the First 
Amendment is concerned, the thumb of risk should already be on the scales 
tilting in favor of free speech protection.  Thus understood, a societal claim 
of sixty percent detriment might well lose to a First Amendment claim of 
forty percent benefit.  One of the problems with ad hoc balancing is that it 
all too regularly ignores the presumption in favor of free speech or the tilt in 
its favor and proceeds to balance as if the scales were even at the outset.  
Thus, the weight of the free speech interest is balanced against that of the 
societal value,46 with some deference to the state’s determinations of its 
 
 43.  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 44.  See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 45.  See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 46.  See, e.g., Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950); Barenblatt v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524 (1951) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring).  More recently, jurists such as Justice Stephen Breyer and scholars such as Robert 
Post have gone even further and have attempted to recalibrate the strict scrutiny and compelling 
interest equations in ways less protective of individual free speech liberty.  See STEPHEN BREYER, 
ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006); ROBERT POST, 
CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014). 
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assertion of societal values and with little or no exacting examination of the 
purported harms said to be caused by the speech in question.47 
In all of this, it is important to note that it is far easier for the State to 
allege normative or societal harms buttressed by attenuated proof of such 
ambiguous harms than it is for the State to clearly demonstrate actual harms 
caused to persons or their property.  For that reason alone, ad hoc balancing 
frequently adds little or nothing to safeguarding First Amendment freedoms.  
In fact, ad hoc balancing typically trades the mandate of the First 
Amendment for a kind of common law balancing and thus returns our 
constitutional order to its pre-1791 status.  If the First Amendment is to have 
any staying power, it cannot stand on an equal footing with any and all so-
called societal or normative values.  Rather, it must, at the outset, be 
presumed to reflect a weightier social interest that can only be overcome by 
proof of actual harm to persons, property or to the administration of justice. 
So, when we think about the spectrum of harms, how might we proceed, 
at least broadly speaking?  By way of a sketch of an answer, we might ask: 
 
 Is the purported harm more speculative or actual? 
 How reliable is the evidence tendered?48 
 Who is really harmed and how? 
 What is the imminence and gravity of the purported 
harm? 
 If the harm is indeed actual, grave, and intentional or 
reckless,49 what is its likely scope? 
 To what extent is the called-for censorship 
specifically tailored to remedying the alleged harm 
and how likely is it that it can do so? 
 Can the harm specified and demonstrated be remedied 
by non-censorial methods?  
 What is the likely duration of the actual and grave 
harm, and will censorship continue beyond the point? 
 
 
 47.  See Rodney A. Smolla, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON 
THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 207[3][b] (“Freedom of speech does not start on a level 
playing field because courts will tend to defer to legislative judgments that have already struck a 
balance against free speech.”) (footnote omitted). 
 48.  This question raises the ever-thorny matter of how to evaluate evidence where there is a 
conflict of interest, as in industry-financed research.  In this particular regard, I am inclined to agree 
with much of Professor Lessig’s thinking and his admonition to be skeptical of (or at least cautious 
about) such evidence.  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS 
CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 29 (2011). 
 49.  See Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255 (2014). 
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A few examples may help to explain my thinking here: 
 
(1) Assume that someone was to say publicly that “the 
vast majority of female students at Walt Whitman 
High School take illegal drugs and engage in illicit sex 
in public places.”  Any alleged harm here is not likely 
to be actual because it is speculative in that the group 
is too ill defined; the “of and concerning” 
requirement50 of the First Amendment has been 
fashioned to address precisely such matters. 
(2) As to the who is harmed question: Assume that a court 
enjoins the display of “gruesome” antiabortion 
material (a.k.a. political, moral, and religious 
advocacy) in a traditional public forum, in order to 
protect the sensibilities of children.51  Harm to 
children may be possible, but their protection comes 
at the expense of content-based restrictions that 
censor rights of adults to express such sentiments and 
the corresponding rights of other adults to receive and 
evaluate them.52 
(3) Consider next the gravity of the purported harm in 
Abrams v. United States.53  While it may be that, in 
the abstract, the threat posed in 1918-19 by the 
dissident provocateurs could damage the war effort, in 
moderated retrospect it appears that the threat was 
more the product of war hysteria than of anything real. 
 
 50.  See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 267, 288 (1964). 
 51.  See Scott v. Saint John’s Church in Wilderness, 194 P.3d 475 (Colo. Ct. App., 2013), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 33 (2013) (author of this Essay signed onto an amicus brief prepared by 
Bruce Johnson in support of the Petitioner). 
 52.  There is also the value of such free speech to children themselves.  See Am. Amusement 
Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that children below voting 
age “must be allowed the freedom to form their political views on the basis of uncensored speech 
before they turn eighteen, so that their minds are not a blank when they first exercise the franchise”). 
 53.  Professor Chafee referred to the Bolshevik-inspired speech in that case as “harmless 
folly.”  See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 140 (1948).  Holmes 
himself thought the judiciary sometimes “rather hysterical” in its response to dissident expression.  
See, e.g., Letter from Holmes to Alice Stopford Green (Mar. 26, 1919), in THE FUNDAMENTAL 
HOLMES, supra note 21, at 224; Letter from Holmes to Harold Laski (Mar. 16, 1919), in THE 
FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 21 at 224; Letter from Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Apr. 25, 
1920), in in THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES, supra note 21, at 290 (regarding Holmes’s criticism of 
Wigmore’s all too “emotion[al]” commentary on the Abrams dissent). 
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(4) Insofar as the scope of the harm is concerned, it may 
be that “protective bubbles” shield women entering 
Planned Parenthood centers from the taunts of self-
righteous antiabortionists54 or that designated “free 
speech zones” protect the president and other high-
ranking government officials from danger.  But how 
real is the danger of actual harm and how far is too far 
to safeguard against that?  More importantly, are such 
censorial practices designed more to quell offensive 
expression than to protect people? 
 
All of the above examples also point to the need of laws that are 
carefully tailored to protect First Amendment interests even if some degree 
of harm were to occur.  The overbreadth doctrine does considerable 
spadework in this conceptual field.  By much the same reasoning, censorial 
measures that win the judicial day in wartime ought not to prevail in later 
years by way of holdover laws (statutory or decisional) when the imminent 
need for such abridgements has vanished.  Having said all of this, let me 
dig a little deeper, and turn over a few normative rocks to see what hides 
beneath them. 
 
At its heart, the debate between Galileo and his ecclesiastical detractors 
was not over science understood as facts, but rather over science understood 
as values (loosely defined).  In the process, the is of the world (its scientific 
facts) was confused with the ought of life (its normative values).  And in that 
universe, where the sun hovers at the center of all things, norms trump 
science just as beliefs prevail over facts.  In the mix, certainty either took a 
back seat to faith or was redefined to comport with it.  Again, consider the 
phrase “moral certainty.”  In its own peculiar way, this not too innocent 
phrase reveals how questions of is and ought can be fused together in the 
unsuspecting and uncritical mind.  That said, one might ask: So how does 
this play out in the First Amendment scheme of things?  Let me offer three 
examples in which questions of fact (scientific matters) yield to questions of 
value (normative matters) with the consequence of compelling individuals 
to adhere to the belief systems of the State no matter how demonstrably false 
those systems are. 
 
 54.  See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (striking down Massachusetts law 
regarding buffer zones around abortion clinics on First Amendment grounds).  See Brief for Eugene 
Volokh et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) 
(No. 12-1168) (providing detail on one side of the issue).  
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With alarming frequency, more and more states compel doctors 
performing abortions to provide women with state-sanctioned information 
(actually religious propaganda) about the purported dangers of abortion.  To 
illustrate: South Dakota law55 requires abortion providers to tell their patients 
that the incidents of mental health problems in women are greater for those 
who have had abortions.  Though this is highly misleading at best,56 the facts 
of the science of the matter have succumbed to the norms of “pro-life” 
advocates.  In some significant respects, this marks the return of the rule of 
the Congregation of the Index. 
By way of another example, recall the arguments of the radical 
feminists who once argued that pornography incites men to commit rapes 
and other acts of violence against women.57  Hence, to tolerate pornography 
was to endorse discrimination against women58 contrary to the equality 
commands of the Constitution.59  However rhetorically powerful such 
arguments might have once been, at their base they lacked the kind of 
scientific proof necessary to vindicate the normative claims made.60  Here, 
 
 55.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2017) (“suicide advisory”), upheld in 
Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 56.  See Susan A. Cohen, Still True: Abortion Does not Increase Women’s Risk of Mental 
Health Problems, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Spring 2013 at 13 (in the interest of full disclosure, 
the author of the article cited in this footnote is my spouse). 
 57.  See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 15–18, 20, 62, 96–97 (1993).  The case 
of “revenge porn” is importantly different insofar as it, 
 
‘transforms individuals’ most intimate moments into pornographic spectacles exposed to 
the general public.  A vengeful ex-partner or malicious hacker can upload an explicit 
image of a victim to a website where thousands of people can view it and hundreds of 
other websites can share it.  In a matter of days, that image can dominate the first several 
pages of ‘hits’ on the victim’s name in a search engine, as well as being emailed or 
otherwise exhibited to the victim’s family, employers, co-workers, and peers.  Non-
consensual pornography can destroy victims’ intimate relationships as well as their 
educational and employment opportunities. 
 
Kaimipono D. Wenger, Legal Developments in Revenge Porn: An Interview with Mary Anne 
Franks, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Oct. 10, 2013), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/ 
10/legal-developments-in-revenge-porn-an-interview-with-mary-anne-franks.html.  If indeed there 
were such demonstrable harms, a properly and narrowly drawn statute, replete with the requisite 
mens rea requirements along with provision for certain exceptions, should be able to withstand 
constitutional challenge. 
 58.  See ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN’S EQUALITY 24–36, 58–66 (1988). 
 59.  See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 
1001 (1986) (rejecting such claims of sexual discrimination). 
 60.  See NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE 
FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS 247–64 (2000) (refuting the claim that antipornography laws would 
reduce violence or discrimination against women). 
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too, the is of the matter was conflated with its ought with the liberty 
guaranteed by the First Amendment hanging in the balance. 
Consider as well the example that gave rise to the controversy in Brown 
v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,61 the violent video game case in which it 
was argued that viewing such games actually induces or influences, either 
directly or otherwise, young players to commit acts of violence.  Once again, 
what drove the State’s claim was the norm of the matter more so than the 
fact of the matter, though the two were loosely lumped together.  Thus, the 
State of California argued that “the First Amendment does not demand proof 
of a direct causal link between exposure to violent video games and harm to 
minors.”62  In that regard, and in an amicus brief filed in the case, Robert 
Corn-Revere made the following telling observation: 
 
In the well-rehearsed script of the typical moral panic, . . . science has 
been used less as a tool for understanding than as currency to be 
exchanged for political leverage.  As a result, the policy debates in this 
area a mélange of social science mixed with politics and advocacy, 
and rarely is there a clear dividing line between the researchers and 
the advocates.  See, e.g., David Trend, The Myth of Media Violence 
45-49 (2007).  The debate over media violence has followed the 
standard script, dominated by “reactionary rhetoric, flawed research, 
and distorted accounts of legitimate scientific studies.”63 
 
These examples reveal that the old ways of the Congregation of the 
Index manifest themselves anew whenever science and faith, or facts and 
values, are conflated.  When functioning properly, the expression clauses of 
the First Amendment keep the State’s faith and norms at bay in order to 
safeguard the rights of the individual whose own sun does not rise and set in 
the officially approved way.  Moreover, in matters touching upon free 
expression and its correlates, the First Amendment prevents the government 
from masquerading as a fact finder when in truth it is a norm enforcer.64 
 
 61.  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 62.  Brief for Petitioner at 45–48, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 
(2011) (the petitioner’s case name was subsequently changed to Brown). 
 63.  Brief for Comic Book Legal Defense Fund as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
16–17, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (No. 08-1448) (quoting 
DAVID TREND, THE MYTH OF MEDIA VIOLENCE 48 (2007)).  Consistent with what is said in the 
text above, Mr. Corn-Revere titled this section of his brief “From Sin to ‘Science’ and Back Again.”  
Id. at 16.  See also Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 64.  Much the same point was made by Justice Anthony Kennedy: “The Constitution exists 
precisely so that opinions and judgments, including esthetic and moral judgments about art and 
literature, can be formed, tested, and expressed.  What the Constitution says is that these judgments 
are for the individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval 
of a majority.”  United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). 
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Before proceeding further down any more philosophical paths, it might 
be useful to clear a little more legal brush in order to see how the operation 
of our current free speech doctrine fits, if at all, into all of this.  Though I 
will return to the philosophical side of things, I think it salutary to flag a few 
related ideas about the wording of the First Amendment and the decisional 
law developed under it.  Permit me to explain why. 
 
While not investing too heavily in the mechanistic determinism of 
originalist and textualist jurisprudence, let us continue by considering (if 
only by way of a reflective aside) the wording of the First Amendment.  This 
perhaps will allow us to better appreciate how it might be said to speak to 
the larger idea behind Galileo’s purported quip.  There is one word that is 
particularly relevant here; it is the word “abridging.”  It is an old-fashioned 
word.  It derives from the Middle English (deprive) and before that from the 
Old French (abbreviate), and before that from the Latin (cut short).  For 
example, when a book or story is abbreviated by cutting short its narrative, 
the abridgement deprives the reader of the complete message.  The term 
“abridge” was the word used by our founders, but not those who drafted the 
Declaration of Independence or the Constitution of 1787 or even the early 
state declarations of rights.  It made its American debut in the First 
Amendment: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”65 
So why that word?  Why not other words such as “respecting” (as in 
the Establishment Clause), or “prohibiting” (as in the Free Exercise Clause), 
or “restrained” (as in the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights), or “deprived” 
(as used in Madison’s June 8, 1789, proposal to the House), or “infringed” 
(as used in a July 28, 1789, House Committee Report)?  Well, it is hard to 
say with certainty since the surviving historical records reveal little.  
Supreme Court decisions say little, and scholarship on the matter is meager.  
And while the word is commonplace in constitutional parlance, it is 
nonetheless a word about which we are never quite sure of its meaning.  
Rather, we skip by any thought of it, much as a man chasing butterflies 
ignores the plant life—like Queen Anne’s Lace, violets, marigolds, and 
maybe even milkweed—vital to the existence of butterflies. 
Etymologically speaking, abridging is when someone else, particularly 
the government, cuts off what we say or write.  To abridge is to abbreviate, 
to command approved brevity.  Or as Samuel Johnson’s 1755 dictionary 
 
 65.  See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 
83–128 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I) (emphasis added). 
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defined it: “To contract, to diminish, to cut short.”66  Such a demand means 
that a censor—one who scrutinizes a work for objectionable content—can 
shorten any message by deleting as much as he or she wishes.  
Constitutionally speaking, all of this is abhorrent because we should be able 
to speak our minds uninterrupted.  The dialogue must continue; the book 
must be read; and the show must go on and on.  Thus, no “prior restraints” 
on freedom of speech or of the press. 
By this logic, to permit the government to abridge expression is to allow 
for the perpetuation of half-truths, or a one-sided views of things, or a one-
size-fits-all code of principles.  One only gets the side of the truth or 
argument or view of whatever the government wants us to hear or read or 
see, but no more.  In the name of censorial brevity, the “whole truth” is not 
permitted and neither is the “full story” or the “uncut” movie or the 
unabridged novel.  Censors—be they in Burma or Cuba or Alabama—fear 
the specter of the abundance of unabridged communicative liberty.  They 
like to call things to an end; they prefer their truths settled; and they are 
certain when there is enough information in the marketplace and whom can 
best dispense it there. 
Without being categorical, this old-fashioned Madisonian textual idea 
was one that equated abridging with government attempts to “cut short” the 
many messages of “We the People.”  Half-truths, condensed government 
records, redacted government documents, abridged literary works, word-
sanitized radio programming, image-sanitized TV programing, and 
campaign restrictions might thus be seen (at least sometimes) as antithetical 
to a vibrant First Amendment.  Such practices trade government ordered 
brevity for the fullness of freedom.  They halt what should be ongoing, 
namely an ongoing exchange of communication, even of the offensive kind. 
In a very real (and conceptual) sense, the First Amendment rebooted the 
mission of the Constitution of 1787.  The original conceptual model was that 
government could only censor expression if it was expressly authorized by 
law to do so, meaning authorized by some provision of the Constitution and 
then by some duly enacted law.  But that was far too slender a reed for the 
Anti-Federalists who sensed, and correctly so, that such an approach was too 
elastic and would not secure the kind of protection they thought worthy of a 
constitutional democracy.  When they prevailed, and when thereafter 
decisional law invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to expand free speech 
liberty,67 the First Amendment became the supreme law.  In doing so, the 
 
 66.  See SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 61 (1755). 
 67.  See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 
666 (1925). 
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constitutional scheme of things became twofold insofar as free expression 
was concerned: (1) government could only do what it was authorized to do, 
and (2) even when authorized it must not abridge those freedoms protected 
under the First Amendment.  By that measure, all citizens could assert more 
freedom.  They could now point to a constitutional provision that 
recognized their right to speak out against their government.  That it took 
a long duration of time for that principle to be honored as a matter of 
judicial review does not deny the significance of this monumental moment 
in our constitutional history. 
If one thinks about it, over the long run the First Amendment typically 
ratchets forward; it protects ever more and more expression and thus limits 
government power more and more.  And when it does so, it contests what 
was once deemed to be certain and beyond question.  It tests truths, contests 
beliefs, and questions values that past generations deemed important enough 
to override the ravages of hostile or offensive expression. 
There is more at stake here than the words of our supreme law and what 
those words connote in our minds when we pause to think of them and what 
they might signify.  There is also the law itself and how it plays out in 
operation vis-à-vis concerns over certainty.  That is, how does the doctrinal 
law of the First Amendment respond to claims of certainty or claims based 
on alleged propositions grounded in certainty or near certainty? 
 
Ever since certain jurists and First Amendment scholars got a 
theoretical whiff of Judge Learned Hand’s incitement test68 and Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s clear-and-present danger test,69 there has been a 
march to follow such conceptual scents.  What we might observe about this 
movement (about which I will say more in a moment) is that it might be seen 
as a jurisprudential move to contest the certainty of those who claim that 
particular types of speech should not be constitutionally protected.  That is, 
sometimes it is not enough for government censors to merely allege harm, 
but instead, they must go to great lengths to demonstrate its existence or 
likelihood.  Hence, by the time the law got to Brandenburg v. Ohio70 some 
half a century later, the censors’ feet were being held to the doctrinal fire.  
By that time, the same certainty that once claimed surefire danger in the 
speech of the likes of Charles Schenck, Eugene Debs, Jacob Abrams, and 
Anita Whitney, came to be judged in much more skeptical terms.  In the 
process, some of the certainty of the past gave way to the skepticism of the 
 
 68.  See Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
 69.  See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 70.  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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present.  The censor’s claims of certainty had to do battle with the reviewing 
courts’ demands for scrutiny.  Just consider the vernacular of the various free 
speech tests that came on the scene between 1919 and 1969: 
 
 Schenck v. United States (Holmes for the Court): “The 
question in every case is whether the words used are 
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as 
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent.  It is a question of proximity and degree.”71 
 Abrams v. United States (Holmes dissenting): “[T]he 
United States constitutionally may punish speech that 
produces or is intended to produce a clear and 
imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith 
certain substantive evils that the United States 
constitutionally may seek to prevent.”72 
 Gitlow v. New York (Holmes dissenting): “[W]hatever 
may be thought of the redundant discourse before us 
it had no chance of starting a present conflagration.  If 
in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian 
dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the 
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning 
of free speech is that they should be given their chance 
and have their way.”73 
 Whitney v. California (Brandeis concurring): “That 
the necessity which is essential to a valid restriction 
does not exist unless speech would produce, or is 
intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of 
some substantive evil which the state constitutionally 
may seek to prevent has been settled.”74 
 Brandenburg v. Ohio (per curiam): “[T]he 
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press 
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy 
of the use of force or of law violation except where 
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
 
 71.  Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 72.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 73.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 74.  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.”75 
 
In this list of doctrinal tests we see the Justices expressing skepticism 
about claims of purported dangers, a shift from the prior presumption of 
reasonable certainty.  To the extent that more certainty of such harms is 
demanded, there is a corresponding degree of real risk.  Granted, there are 
hard cases such as Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project76 where there has 
been functional pushback.  Even so, the insistence for more certainty of harm 
finds expression in the modern line of commercial speech cases such as 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,77 where censorial claims of harm have been 
more closely scrutinized.  To much the same effect, rules such as the 
overbreadth doctrine78 and the narrowly tailored doctrine79 rein in the realm 
of censorship by demanding more exacting line drawing and likewise urging 
avoidance of censorship if possible.  And then there is the Roberts Court’s 
seemingly uncompromising approach to protecting speech unless it is 
categorically subject to a traditional free speech exception.80  In all of these 
ways, and still others, certainty is very much a concern of modern free speech 
jurisprudence, though unlike the past, today certainty is often the very card 
that defeats the censor’s own hand. 
There is more to be considered insofar as our focus remains on certainty 
and how it interacts with censorship.  For example, in the era of the Roberts 
Court, the certainty and risk dynamic move along nontraditional free speech 
tracks.  Just consider the fact that Milton and Meiklejohn no longer rule the 
jurisprudential roost of the First Amendment.  Likewise, the normative 
importance of truth is a currency that is decreased all too regularly.  Rather, 
the First Amendment is called into the mechanical service81 of those who 
trade in animal “crush videos”82 and violent video games,83 along with those 
who lie about military medals84 and others who feel called upon by Great 
 
 75.  Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
 76.  Holder, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 77.  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 78.  See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997). 
 79.  See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986). 
 80.  See Collins, supra note 36. 
 81.  See Collins, supra note 36, at 414–24 (discussing and critiquing use of the “traditional 
exceptions” to the First Amendment approach to judicial decision-making). 
 82.  See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
 83.  See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 84.  See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
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God to protest near military funerals.85  And then there is the issue of the 
First Amendment being tapped in the service of corporations eager to spend 
untold amounts of money to endorse the candidates they support and oppose 
those they condemn.86 
The takeaway: Those overriding norms that at one time seemed so 
central to any notion of free speech no longer have the same cache that they 
once may have enjoyed.  To the extent that they are even invoked, they are 
done so in a decorative manner as by way of rhetorical embellishment or 
what have you.  Insofar as the articulation of the law is concerned, much free 
speech normative thinking (classic and contemporary) is operationally inert, 
however in vogue it may be in the legal academy.  In short, there is much 
less certainty about which norms should or should not be the conceptual 
touchstone for deciding First Amendment cases.  And that means that raw 
risk calculations ratchet up proportionally, thus leaving us more risk prone. 
With all of the above said, let us next consider, albeit in a cursory way, 
the relationship between certainty, risk, and adversity.87  The word adverse 
derives from the Latin adversus, meaning against or opposite.  Assuredly, 
Galileo the heretic was an adversary of the governing body and its governing 
norms; his views concerning the heliocentric theory of Copernicus were 
adverse to those of the Church.  In that sense, then, his message was 
adversarial, meaning in clear opposition to the tenets of the Holy Apostolic 
Truth.  And were the Church Fathers to tolerate Galileo’s scientific gospel, 
they risked putting their own truths in jeopardy . . . or so they feared.  Judged 
by such considerations, the adversarial voice—the voice of the other—is one 
that tests, on the one hand, the censorial limits placed on free speech by those 
certain of their belief systems or, on the other hand, challenges the belief 
systems of those uncertain of the viability of their beliefs—the ones thus in 
need of government intervention in order to perpetuate them by censorial 
measures.  Where certainty rules, such adversity is vital, if only to test time-
and-again the premises that inform it and the logic that implements it. 
Adversity cuts both ways; that is, it should also turn inwards to a 
willingness to test the certainty of one’s own views.  Quite often the 
rebellious are so self-righteous that they fail to see the shortcomings of their 
own rants.  While the First Amendment should nonetheless protect them 
 
 85.  See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012). 
 86.  See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2011). 
 87.  See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE EXPRESSION AND 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1–27, 176–81 (2013) (describing and defending 
role of adversarial expression in a democratic society). 
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(recall New York Times Co. v. Sullivan88), this does not mean that their 
messages are beyond critique and criticism.  The give-and-take envisioned 
by the ideal of the First Amendment stands to do just that, provided one 
keeps an open mind.  Or to cast it as the discerning and ever-skeptical Justice 
Holmes did: “To have doubted one’s own first principles is the mark of a 
civilized man.”89  Better still, in a 1925 letter to Lewis Einstein, Holmes took 
it a step further: “Scepticism is a saving grace if it takes in enough of 
oneself.”90  Ironically, sometimes the adversarial figure is so critical of 
certain things that she is unable to appreciate the value of self-criticism.  
“The greatest dangers to liberty,” Justice Brandeis cautioned, “lurk in 
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without 
understanding.”91  While a healthy First Amendment culture surely needs 
adversarial types (offensive92 and aggregating as they can be), it also needs 
others willing to contest the kind of adversarial certainty that honors no view 
other than its own. 
 
Just to be clear: Not all First Amendment jurisprudential configurations 
fit neatly into the box of the certainty-risk notion I have been discussing.  
Things like properly crafted laws concerning actual fraud, real trade secrets, 
true threats, genuine copyright violations, actual child pornography, and the 
like continue to demand a different calculation.93  We are less willing to take 
 
 88.  See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (recognizing an almost 
absolute First Amendment right to defame public officials). 
 89.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Ideas and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1915). 
 90.  Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein (June 1, 1925), in THE 
HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS 241–42 (James B. Peabody ed., 1964). 
 91.  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted). 
 92.  That we protect such speech has been deemed to be a proud tenet of our free speech 
jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (“But no matter how the point 
is phrased, [the government’s] unmistakable thrust is this: The Government has an interest in 
preventing speech expressing ideas that offend.  And, as we have explained, that idea strikes at the 
heart of the First Amendment.  Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, 
age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech 
jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’  United States v. 
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).”). 
 93.  Even so, when invoking such labels, it is well to remember the following important 
admonition: 
 
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give 
any more weight to the epithet ‘libel’ than we have to other ‘mere labels’ of state law. . . . 
Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, 
solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for the repression of 
expression that have been challenged in this court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity 
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any risks in these areas (though even here there is some leeway at the 
definitional level).  This is but another way of saying that our ever-
emerging law concerning the various forms of modern free speech is not 
easily contained under a single conceptual umbrella.  If at one time we 
tended to move in that direction (e.g., Thomas Emerson’s “Toward a 
General Theory of the First Amendment”94), then that time seems to have 
passed insofar as we now seem to be moving away from such all-purpose 
theories.  Quite apart from the historical development of free speech law 
and how it has evolved in modern times, there is also a deeper point to be 
pondered.  It, too, concerns certainty and how it is that we buy into it . . . 
step by conceptual step.  Isaiah Berlin once remarked that “[i]deas are the 
commodity in which intellectuals deal.”95  Indeed.  And how many in that 
crowd—be they in philosophy, history, or law—love to invest in some 
grand unitary idea by which all in life or law can be explained by way of a 
single architectonic claim?  In this regard, let us reflect upon yet another 
sentiment tendered by Mr. Berlin: “I’ve got no . . . terrible interest,” he 
once declared offhandedly, “in people with a single vision; on the contrary, 
I think them very grand, important geniuses, but dangerous.”96  Nice!  
Judged by that standard, free speech giants of the order of John Milton or 
Alexander Meiklejohn—along with their modern-day adherents (who veer 
here and there, but remain true to some fetishized creed of an 
Enlightenment or Democratic Governance ideal)—may well be geniuses.  
Something of the same might be said of seasoned Originalists or savvy 
Textualists.  Yet even granting that, Mr. Berlin warns us that they are 
dangerous.  Why?  Without venturing to speak for the late social theorist, 
let me offer a few ideas, at least as they might operate in the First 
Amendment arena. 
If one is a “single vision” scholar of the Aristotelian school, then he 
looks for the telos of things—that is, the purpose of something or the end 
towards which it aims.  Of course, such pursuits are premised on the 
foundational idea that all things have both such singular purposes and that 
we can discern them.  By the same token, if one is a “single vision” scholar 
of the Enlightenment school, then he looks for the ways—scientific and 
 
from constitutional limitations.  It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First 
Amendment. 
 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (citation & footnotes omitted). 
 94.  Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 
877 (1963). 
 95.  ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX: AN ESSAY ON TOLSTOY’S VIEW OF 
HISTORY 27 (Henry Hardy ed., 2d ed., 2013). 
 96.  Id. at 102. 
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social—that the world can be explained in some comprehensive and 
intelligible way.  Yet again, if one is a “single vision” scholar of the 
Democratic Governance school, then he or she looks for all the ways by 
which government, in all its diverse aspects, can be reconciled with that 
overriding idea.  In the philosophical process, everything from the laws of 
gravity to the laws of free speech is categorized or characterized or 
compartmentalized to comport with some Grand Unitary Vision (“GUV”).  
And what does not fit into that scheme of things is either marginalized or 
ostracized.  To translate this into to First Amendment terms, speech that is at 
odds with the GUV is deemed unworthy of constitutional protection and thus 
carrion for insatiable censors.97  In such a world, there is haughty confidence 
rather than humble uncertainty. 
Certainty sometimes manifests itself in the most striking ways when we 
close our minds.  In this regard, we may be entirely certain of the Truth of 
our own cause or of the Evil of another’s cause so as to demand that our side 
of the story be the Whole Truth.  It all comes out the same in the censorial 
wash.  Something of the same holds true for how we think about the First 
Amendment and how we theorize about it.  Whether it be Milton or 
Meiklejohn, the Enlightenment principle or the checking function, or self-
realization or democratization, such theories serve to cabin speech, curb 
expression, or cut short some idea or ideology or way of communicating 
something from one person to another.  This is so even when such theories 
of truth might advance the cause of free speech in the short run but restrict it 
in the long run.  Simply consider the case of the famed free speech theorist 
Alexander Meiklejohn (1872-1974).98  Unquestionably, his bold views 
helped to usher in a new and liberating mindset in our First Amendment 
jurisprudence, which was quite important in the years leading up to, during, 
and shortly after the McCarthy era.  Then again, Zechariah Chafee (who had 
rallied to Meiklejohn’s defense when Amherst’s trustees fired him for 
unpopular ideas99) criticized the great scholar’s free speech norms when he 
took skeptical aim at them in a Harvard Law Review article—Meiklejohn’s 
public versus private speech dichotomy, Zechariah maintained, was both ill-
 
 97.  For a contemporary example of such GUV free speech thinking, see ROBERT C. POST, 
CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014); or by way of 
an originalist GUV, see Akhil Amar, The First Amendment’s Firstness, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1015 (2014). 
 98.  See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & SAM CHALTAIN, WE MUST NOT BE AFRAID TO BE FREE: 
STORIES OF FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 39–58 (2011). 
 99.  See Meiklejohn Quits Amherst: Trustees Urge Retirement, WASH. POST, June 20, 1923, 
at 2. 
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conceived and capable of being applied to censor science, art, drama, and 
poetry.100 
It is both ironic and accurate that theories of free speech liberty can pave 
the way for censorship.  If time is on truth’s side, it is mainly because truth 
is not static; it is often molded to the different times and circumstances in 
which it finds itself.  It evolves much like a giant oak, too slow to be seen by 
an untrained eye, but too big to be ignored by any eye.  Though we dare not 
say it openly or too loudly, to concede this is to permit a sardonic spoonful 
of honey to be added to our overconfident understanding of the eternal mix 
of things.  But such is life. 
GUV thinkers tend to be certain of their theories and equally certain of 
the need for society to align itself with such theories.  Thus, if you are a strict 
GUV follower of the Enlightenment school, expression that is primarily 
artistic (say, Jackson Pollock) or entertaining (say, George Carlin) will likely 
be beyond the pale of First Amendment protection unless some analytical 
liberties are taken in applying that GUV principle.  So, too, if you are a GUV 
thinker of the Democratic Governance school, expression that is primarily 
commercial (say, a Geico commercial) or offered up by for-profit corporate 
entities (say, the Nike Co.) may well find itself outside the way of First 
Amendment protection.  Then again, if your GUV is steeped in some notion 
of free speech being inextricably and exclusively linked to the advancement 
of the political process, then some racy artistic expression (say, that of Robert 
Mapplethorpe) or much sexual expression (say, 50 Shades of Grey) will be 
subject to censorial whims.  What all these examples have in common in this: 
Where there is a GUV theory, there will often be certainty in the first instance 
and censorship in the second.  In other words, the theory behind censorship 
is theory, or at least Grand Theory. 
There is yet more: One of the practical consequences of GUV theorizing 
is that it forces First Amendment lawyers representing dissident or 
unorthodox clients to fabricate constitutional fictions.  The job of such 
lawyers is to try to place the square peg of their clients’ speech into round 
normative holes.  Or to vary the metaphor, lawyers must disingenuously 
pigeonhole their client’s speech into the normative boxes compatible with 
the GUV principle.  In the course of things, comedy becomes political action, 
erotic sexual expression becomes self-realization, offensive speech becomes 
cultural criticism, and imagistic commercial expression becomes consumer 
information.  Such expression may or may not fairly fall into such categories, 
but lawyers should not be forced to perpetuate hypocrisy in order to appease 
 
 100.  See Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech: And Its Relation to Self-Government, 62 HARV. L. 
REV. 891 (1949). 
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the GUV crowd and thus prevail in court.  Strange as it is, in such 
circumstances falsity is necessarily called into the service of placing a 
normative face on aberrant expression. 
If any of this strikes a cord of soundness, then the point to be gleaned 
here is that GUV free speech theories first invite censorship and then set out 
to legitimize it.  The piquancy of such theories is that they seem to turn chaos 
into order, danger into safety, harshness into humanity, power into 
democracy, while at the same time assuring us that such theories can manage 
risk to allowable levels.  In such risk-free and safe worlds, pornographers are 
kept at bay, the captains of commerce are muzzled, so-called antidemocratic 
corporate entities are driven out of the electoral arena, and those who offend 
us are relegated to the realm of fenced in “free speech zones.”  Though liberty 
may not dance with hands waiving free, here is the purported quid pro quo: 
our land is SAFE thanks to the GUV that rules over us in ways generally 
reminiscent of the Guardians in Plato’s Republic.101 
As noted earlier, and given the underlying premises of many so-called 
theories of free speech, their practical effect is to diminish the realm of First 
Amendment freedom.  This is true either as to how free speech is defined102 
or how it is balanced against normative considerations.  Consequently, such 
theories are more appropriately viewed as anti-free speech theories.  Why?  
Because if speech does not comport with the normative criteria proffered, 
then the expression in question loses any claim to constitutional protection.  
Put another way, many speech theorists demand that speech prove its 
normative worth before it is protected.  Here is how it works: They construct 
some utopian republic (utopian to them, though perhaps dystopian to us) that 
is invented to further illusory ideals and then work backwards from there and 
demands that if speech is to be protected it must comport with those ideals.  
That speech as speech should be protected, they view as absurd since so 
many kinds of expression (ranging from securities fraud to revenge porn to 
perjury) are seemingly beyond the pale.  Hence, for them, speech must earn 
its way to First Amendment protection.  It must be tied to the tale of some 
utopian kite.  Only then can it be legitimated; only then can it assume the 
mantle of worthy expression. 
But this, I submit, is to flip the First Amendment on its head.  The 
constitutional premise of the 1791 guaranty should work conversely: Speech 
is presumptively protected.  It should, that is, be entitled to the protection 
that accompanies that presumption absent some subsequent clear 
 
 101.  See Ronald K.L. Collins & David Skover, The Guardians of Knowledge in the Modern 
State: Post’s Republic and the First Amendment, 87 WASH. L. REV. 369 (2012). 
 102.  For example, at one time some did not consider defamation, expressive conduct, sexual 
expression, or commercial expression, as speech entitled to First Amendment protection. 
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demonstration of an actual, imminent, and significant harm.  For the most 
part, it need demonstrate no more; it need not bow to the dictates of 
Utopian Masters. 
In some very fundamental respects, the logic of the First Amendment 
cuts against the grain of the GUV crowd.  It does so in several ways: First, it 
reverses the traditional pre-1791 presumption103 so that it favors free speech 
at the outset (“Congress shall make no law”); second, it endorses the idea 
that some degree of real risk must be endured and some measure of actual 
offense tolerated; third, it does not create rigid and hierarchical categories of 
speech (just consider the modern development of the law of defamation and 
commercial speech); and fourth, it need not be beholden to so-called 
democratic theories of majoritarian rule or the common good.  Admittedly, 
such a view of the First Amendment is an unabashed one, rooted more in 
liberty than security and thus dependent on a liberal degree of toleration. 
We the People need not take our conceptual cues from free speech 
theorists who are more appropriately viewed as the modern-day descendants 
of the Congregation of the Index.  In these times when the liberal academy 
and the illiberal think tank carry much influence, what the First Amendment 
may need most is less theory and more liberty.  While I do not argue for that 
categorically, I am nonetheless willing to defend that idea as long as 
reasonably possible, taking due account for a generous ration of risk. 
Before leaving this subject, let me add a few more words, beginning 
with these questions: Why theory?  What purpose, if any, does it serve?  
Might we have a First Amendment sans theory?  In a rudimentary sense, 
First Amendment theory might be said to serve two purposes: First, to help 
rein in, “explain,” or criticize the in-and-outs of decisional law.  And second, 
theory shades the law in a blanket of norms, sometimes labeled “universal” 
or “inalienable” or “fundamental” or “long-standing.” 
As to the first purpose, part and parcel of legal analysis is the ability to 
understand how the law is conceptualized and reconceptualized by those 
who direct or interpret its course.  Each generation of scholars has its builders 
and levelers, its conceptualists and contextualists, its formalists and anti-
formalists, its Langdells and Llewellyns, and so on.104  And in the First 
Amendment world, the law has been bound by the likes of William 
 
 103.  See WALTER F. BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 228 (1965) 
(“The argument for freedom is a distinctly modern one . . . . [That is,] freedom was not the central 
political principle that it was to become after the influence of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau . . . . 
Instead of freedom, older writers considered virtue the organizing principle . . . ”).  Thus 
understood, the First Amendment and the Bill of Rights as a whole, marked a radical departure 
from past precedent. 
 104.  See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT ix (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995). 
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Blackstone and unbound by the likes of Leonard Levy.105  By design or 
accident, the process of classification (like that of precedent) trades, at some 
significant point, in a falsity.  Lawyers do it, judges replicate it, and scholars 
complicate it by way of their own conceptual templates.  Absent some 
normative telos, so the argument goes, the process is more mechanical than 
philosophical, and in that sense might even be seen as game like, though an 
important game to be sure.  The main gloss that might be added here is that 
concerning the demands of equality, of the law’s obligation to treat similarly 
situated people similarly.  That said, do we really need High Theory to check 
the excesses of runaway judicial decision-making?  If precedent is built on 
some meaningful and constrained understanding of actual (as opposed to 
fetishized theoretical) harm, then that should suffice for analytical purposes. 
As to the second purpose, which can work in tandem with its 
predecessor, theory hopes to explain or justify what we do or fail to do in the 
course of human events, including those events concerning our system of 
free expression.  With Aristotelian allure, it points to a “higher good” (e.g., 
the acquisition of truth, self-realization, or personal autonomy) by which the 
law of free expression should be measured and judged.  Unitary theories are 
created in the process of shrewdly linking facts to precedents and then 
linking those precedents to some so-called “desired” norm.  If there is a “fit” 
(subjective as that determination is), then speech is protected, but if not, 
theory abridges expression without any constitutional qualm.  Seen in this 
light, theory might be said to have a moderating influence on the law of free 
speech; it cleanses the conceptual house while restraining human behavior 
that might otherwise be deemed objectionable.  Hence, theory is Pater-like; 
it is the Father of the State telling us what we can say or not say (e.g., we 
cannot publicly express visual sexuality, we cannot advertise condoms, or 
we cannot speak ill of our government employers).  In such a Pater world 
the First Amendment is a bastard; it owes no allegiance to the ideal of 
censorial paternalism.  It does not deny norms or morals or truths; rather, it 
demands no more than that private individuals decide such moderating 
principles instead of having the State dictate them.  This is the basic idea 
behind the religion clauses and should likewise have some bearing on the 
way we think about the expression clauses. 
Free speech in a world without highbrow, overblown, and self-serving 
normative theories linked to governmental regulation of expression need not 
pave the way to a Borgia’s Rome.  Again, those norms have their place in 
the private sphere and in the governmental one too, provided only that speech 
 
 105.  See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 309–10 (1985) (historically 
repudiating Blackstone). 
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is not impermissibly abridged.  Behind every High Theory of free speech 
dwells the God of Piety, who in one way or another demands that many kinds 
of speech be abridged in her honor.  But the time has long passed for those 
of us in the free speech community to continue to worship at such altars.  In 
our postmodern times, the role of the state in free speech matters is a humble 
one, not a self-righteous one; it is to protect speech more than silence it.  The 
state is not a Pater or Goddess so much as a restrained policeman on duty to 
safeguard the Commonwealth against real harms waged by real people 
against other people. 
Now, it will surely be said that all of this talk of harm is no more than 
a norm masquerading as something it is not.  And, so that argument would 
go, to understand that norm one would need a theory of harm.  Fair enough.  
Still, I have ventured to address this issue in my earlier discussion of the 
spectrum of harms.106  Conceptually speaking, what is crucial in this regard 
is the need to harness any notion of harm lest it swallow up the very freedom 
the First Amendment was designed to preserve.  In that regard, what the 
GUV crowd is most adept at, is fusing its values into alleged harms that 
demand governmental intervention. 
 
I want to step back for a moment and tease out a few, if you will, larger 
but related philosophical and psychological points.  Let me begin this way: 
To be social, to be a part of civil society, a person must at some point 
sublimate his or her expressive instincts.  Otherwise we would find ourselves 
in the throes of a Hobbesian melee.  For the most part, that is part of the price 
we pay for civilization.  By that measure, expressive instinct is hobbled in 
the name of political necessity.  Still, if carried too far, such a move destroys 
individuality by homogenizing it in the name of safety and civility.  If 
instinctual individuality is not to be destroyed, if it is not to be totally or 
significantly sublimated, there must be some release valve, some social 
mechanism that permits a dollop or more of the very thing that might (in the 
long run) destroy it. 
 
The First Amendment is that release valve. 
 
Among other things, the early speech-versus-conduct dichotomy in 
First Amendment jurisprudence spoke, in a way, to the general point I am 
 
 106.  See supra text accompanying note 47.  In a future work (tentatively titled In Harm’s Way), 
I plan to say more, much more, about harm, how we speak and think of it, and its relation to the 
First Amendment.  For today, however, brevity demands that I put such thoughts on hold, if only 
to provide my detractors with a measure of goading doubt. 
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trying to make.  On the one hand, certain kinds of conduct are too close to 
the Hobbesian side of the destructive equation to be tolerated.  Hence, they 
are not constitutionally protected.  It may well be symbolic expression to 
heave a rock through the window of political foe, but such expression cannot 
be sanctioned if the Republic is to endure.  The takeaway point here is that 
this kind of instinctual behavior wars with the survival and social premises 
of any polity.  On the other hand, certain kinds of speech are distant enough 
from the specter of Hobbesian bedlam and mayhem as to be tolerated.  
Hence, they are constitutionally protected.  By that logic we may say the 
vilest of things about our political opponents and, by and large, avoid the 
punitive hand of the law.  Here the takeaway point is that of the release valve, 
the idea that some degree of instinctual expression is to be allowed, if only 
as a concession to individual freedom. 
In both a philosophical and psychological sense, the First Amendment 
works to mediate the war between the self and society.  Absent such kinds 
of mediation, society would virtually crush almost all varieties of instinctual 
expression it found to be adverse to any or all of its interests, however 
broadly or vaguely defined.  Of course, the instinctual self is never satisfied 
and thus demands more expression and thus ever less sublimation.  In some 
respect, this may help to explain why we have witnessed the vast expansion 
of free speech freedoms in modernity.  Symbolic expression—i.e., flag 
burning, cross burning, armband wearing, nude dancing—exemplifies how 
even certain kinds of expressive conduct came to be constitutionally 
protected, or at least partially so.  Though over the dissent of the likes of 
Justice Hugo Black,107 the march for yet more protection for expressive 
behavior continues. 
Insofar as modern American culture is concerned, in the past several 
decades we have witnessed less individual sublimation and more societal 
toleration.  In the process, many believe we are today experiencing the 
coarsening of our culture, insofar as the First Amendment has been rallied, 
to protect everything from deviant forms of sexual expression108 to violent 
forms of entertainment109 to hateful forms of expression.110  All triumphs 
for almost instinctual expression, to be sure.  But also, all defeats for 
societal civility. 
There is more: One reason why the Certainty Principle (or if you prefer, 
the Truth Principle) is antithetical to First Amendment freedom is because 
 
 107.  See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 516–22 (1969) 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
 108.  See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 109.  See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 110.  See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
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so much of the human psyche consists of a rich cross section of 
contradictions—of beliefs pointing in different directions and of thought 
being divergent from behavior.  Such contradictions—in philosophic 
stances, economic principles, religious beliefs, scientific premises, and  
various interpretative canons—can be so significant as to be existential in 
character.  Because of that, we need a body of constitutive law that allows 
for a measure of divergent thought and behavior at the micro and macro 
levels.  While precedent is said to be binding in law (though actually it is not 
quite so), it has little place in the expressive affairs of men and women.  Their 
lives and their societal interactions often demand some real and messy 
degree of illogical divergence from the normative edicts of the enlightened 
or well-washed few.  In other words, there has to be some breathing space 
for instinctual expression, messy at that, it will always prove to be. 
It is a very famous line in First Amendment jurisprudence, one that 
warrants yet further examination: “[W]e consider this case against the 
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it 
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks on government and public officials.”111  Here, we can see in budding 
form the case for instinctual expression—i.e., expression that is unrepressed 
in character, vicious in tone, scathing in temper, and unrepressed in voicing 
anger.  This release of the uninhibited self onto the body politic is indicative 
of the character of risks we as a society now take in the name of free speech 
liberty.  Most assuredly, it is not the kind of risk that the Congregation of the 
Index would have ever tolerated.  But, for better or worse, we have moved 
on from those days, from that mindset, and from that notion of the relation 
between the individual and her society.  We have, in other words, embarked 
on a grand experiment in both political philosophy and in psychological 
wellbeing. 
 
Mindful of what I have just said and more, the tension between the 
Galileos and the Congregation of the Index of the worlds is inevitable.  What 
distinguishes the American experiment in freedom is that we have a 
constitutional commitment to the old heretic and a corresponding skepticism 
of ecclesiastical inquisitors and their modern-day counterparts.  I do not say 
that our commitment is either certain or absolute; but I do think it should be 
aspirational to the greatest extent humanly possible.112 
 
 111.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (emphasis added). 
 112.  E.g., RONALD K.L. COLLINS, NUANCED ABSOLUTISM: FLOYD ABRAMS AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 39–40, 70–72, 120–132 (2013). 
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Notice that I do not stress any particular reason why I argue as I do; that 
is, I do not offer the kind of norm that would be the crown jewel of some 
High Theory of free speech.  I may be wrong.  Even so, there is something 
splendid in being outside of that High Theory Crowd if such a stance points 
to an appreciation of the First Amendment that is more renegade than 
retrograde, more tolerant than intolerant, more creative than cabined, and 
surely more risk prone than risk averse.  Cast in romantic terms, America 
sorely needs more George Anastaplos113 and Daniel Ellsbergs114 and 
certainly more government whistleblowers.115  By and large, we have come 
a long way in safeguarding the freedoms of such troublemakers.  Then again, 
the road is a long one and we as a nation still have many miles to go. 
It is hard, to be sure, to altogether dismiss normative claims from the 
conceptual table.  And one could not do so for both pragmatic and (of course) 
normative reasons, at least not without fear of being branded a depraved 
nihilist.  In this respect, my point is a modest one: If the First Amendment is 
to have any operative meaning and strength, it must begin with some 
meaningful consideration of real harms.  Thereafter, if norms are what we 
must have, then the steel of normative assertions must be strictly tested . . . 
time and again.  Otherwise wild-eyed claims to Truth and a host of other 
Values will trump First Amendment freedoms time and again.  This was as 
true in the McCarthy era with its obsession with Communists as it is today 
in the national security era with its preoccupation with government leakers.  
Mere assertions tend towards the ought side of the conceptual equation, 
while demonstrative proof tends towards the is side. 
Necessity makes its demands.  Thus, some accommodation will always 
be needed.  Such a constitutional accommodation is exemplified in the time, 
place, and manner exception to the First Amendment.  Accordingly, one 
could not fairly claim a First Amendment right to erect a 100-foot 
commercial neon sign in a residential area or have a raucous rock concert 
near a neighborhood if the blare of Led Zeppelin-like electric guitars 
continued on into the wee hours.  This is reasonable enough, even by my 
harm standards.  But accommodation turns to misapplication when the 
exception is tapped to silence unpopular expression.  Case in point: In Feiner 
 
 113.  See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 97–116 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); COLLINS & 
CHALTAIN, supra note 98, at 4–16. 
 114.  See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); COLLINS & CHALTAIN, 
supra note 98, at 59–87. 
 115.  In this regard, the 5-4 ruling in Garcetti v. Ceballos, evidences a cramped view of the 
First Amendment—a view that all too cavalierly places the maintenance of employee timidity in 
the workplace over the public disclosure of government wrongdoing.  547 U.S. 410 (2006).  
Happily, and as noted earlier, the Garcetti rule was tamed a bit in favor of a modicum more of free 
speech freedom in the case of Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 1533 (2014). 
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v. New York,116 Justice Hugo Black was certainly warranted in taking 
exception to the liberty Chief Justice Fred Vinson took in sustaining Irving 
Feiner’s conviction for disorderly conduct.  To quote Justice Black: 
 
The record before us convinces me that petitioner, a young college 
student, has been sentenced to the penitentiary for the unpopular views 
he expressed on matters of public interest while lawfully making a 
street-corner speech in Syracuse, New York.  Today’s decision, 
however, indicates that we must blind ourselves to this fact because 
the trial judge fully accepted the testimony of the prosecution 
witnesses on all important points.  Many times in the past this Court 
has said that despite findings below, we will examine the evidence for 
ourselves to ascertain whether federally protected rights have been 
denied; otherwise review here would fail of its purpose in 
safeguarding constitutional guarantees.  Even a partial abandonment 
of this rule marks a dark day for civil liberties in our Nation.117 
 
The maxim that time, place, and manner restrictions must be content 
neutral118 and narrowly tailored represents a judicial attempt to rein in 
abuses, though cases such as Feiner reveal that if the exception is too freely 
applied abuses will surely occur.  The Court’s opinion in Frisby v. Schultz119 
is indicative of the need to monitor the invocation of even this rather 
pragmatic exception.120  Here, again, the important point is to verify 
claims121—pragmatic or normative—when invoked for some purported need 
 
 116.  Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
 117.  Id. at 321–322 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 118.  See Kate Yannitte, Content-Neutral Time, Place, Manner Restrictions on Free Speech—
A Municipality’s Park Ordinance That Requires a Permit to Assemble More than Fifty People Is 
Facially Constitutional, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 825, 830 (2002). 
 119.  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (striking down on First Amendment grounds total 
ban on displaying flags or banners on public sidewalk surrounding the Supreme Court). 
 120.  See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[E]ven in a public 
forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of 
protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and 
that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.’”) (citations 
omitted). 
 121.  In this regard, the Court has been far too lenient in denying First Amendment claims in 
cases where local authorities cavalierly invoke the “secondary effects doctrine.”  See, e.g., City of 
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (upholding ban on total nudity in “dancing 
establishment”).  See David L. Hudson, Jr., Secondary-Effects Doctrine, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (Sept. 
13, 2002), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/secondary-effects-doctrine (“The secondary-
effects doctrine has proven to be fertile ground for abuse because it enables government officials 
to conceal their thinly disguised dislike for adult entertainment behind claims of harmful effects.”).  
The way the doctrine has been applied is a good example of morals regulations masquerading as 
scientific fact. 
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to abridge freedom of speech, press, petition, assembly, or the free exercise 
of one’s faith.  The more courts set out to verify, and to do so factually and 
honestly, the more likely they are to see that the harm lawmakers feared was 
the harm that we imagined. 
 
For some fastidious types, much of what is set out herein will be seen 
as unduly broad, coarse, and lacking in the kinds of analytical molding and 
varnish that law professors delight in championing (if only in impenetrable 
theory).  In their eyes, such views may smack of the rank absolutism once 
espoused by Justice Hugo Black.122  Likewise, my guess is that the brand of 
presumptive liberty I have urged will be understood as imprudently oblivious 
to the demands of context and the need for balancing (albeit endless 
contextual balancing).  Contextualists are not likely to endorse stringent First 
Amendment protection of the brand vouchsafed in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,123 Brandenburg v. Ohio,124 Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Comm’n,125 United States v. Stevens,126 and the like.  For them, such 
protection should not be seen as the normal or default position of freedom.  
Although this position may represent the rhetorical high ground, for them it 
also proves to be the analytical low ground.  Seen in that skeptical light, the 
First Amendment must be read narrowly.  Thus, they claim: “In reality, the 
First Amendment itself is an exception to the prevailing principle that speech 
may be regulated in the normal course of government business.”127  This 
claim reverses the presumption I have urged and replaces it, at least 
operationally speaking, with a kind of due process, case-by-case form of 
 
 122.  See HUGO L. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 45 (1969); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND HIS CRITICS 126–50 (1988); Justice Black and the First Amendment 
“Absolutes”: A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549 (1962).  It is all too easy to dismiss Black’s 
absolutism, which did have its analytical problems, as grossly simplistic.  Of course, such an 
assessment presumes his true jurisprudential intentions.  In that regard, it is well to remember that 
he was a “master tactician . . . who used his forensic and temperamental skills to great advantage.”  
Dennis J. Hutchinson, Hugo Black Among Friends, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1885, 1893 (1995) (reviewing 
Hugo Black: A Biography by Roger K. Newman).  Whatever one may say of Black’s absolutism, 
it did make Justice Brennan’s near absolutism relatively palpable.  Viewed in that light, they may 
well have had a “harmony of goals.”  See William J. Brennan, Jr., Remarks on the Occasion of the 
Justice Hugo L. Black Centennial, in JUSTICE BLACK AND MODERN AMERICA 171, 181 (Tony 
Freyer, ed., 1990) (quoting Justice Frankfurter). 
 123.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 124.  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 125.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 126.  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 127.  Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism in IF BUCKLEY FELL: 
A FIRST AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 103, 110 (E. Joshua 
Rosenkranz ed., 1999) (emphasis added). 
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decision-making.  One need not validate Justice Black’s absolutist creed in 
order to discern that such an unbridled contextual approach to the First 
Amendment would very much constrict the very degree of freedom to which 
we as a people have become accustomed, if only grudgingly at times. 
Though it is seldom, if ever, mentioned, certainty (or the insistence on 
it) is what fuels much of the contextualist animus towards more so-called 
libertarian interpretations of the First Amendment.  Because we can never be 
sure about the consequences of liberty, its domain must be restricted.  
Otherwise, we subject ourselves to unforeseen risks.  On that score, I repeat: 
A high degree of risk is vital to freedom.  Freedom is decreased proportionate 
to the degree to which risk (often imagined) is diminished.  Here the focus 
is on the nexus between the demand for certainty and the avoidance of risk.  
Since certainty can seldom, if ever, be determined, there will always be 
consequential risks. 
I contend that contrariety makes for a better First Amendment fit than 
certainty.  The ability to be torn, to hold opposing ideas at the same time, is, 
I think, a necessary condition for forthright thinking.  To reconsider, 
reformulate, reinvent, and rearticulate one’s thought128 allows it to evolve 
beyond the rigid constraints of certainty.  True, contextualism can sometimes 
help in that process.  But it is all too often contextualism in the service of an 
often futile form of certainty.  Contextualists simply will not abide 
uncertainty and the purported risks that accompany it.  Hence, they champion 
the fluidity of context in order to rein in free speech freedom.  There are just 
too many variables, they argue, to allow for much of anything approximating 
a bright line rule or presumption in favor of liberty.  Then again, even 
contextualists would concede that there may be a degree of fortified 
protection for particular kinds of expression (e.g., pure political speech) in 
particular contexts (e.g., town hall meetings) provided, of course, due 
allowance is made for time, place, and manner restrictions.  While this 
Norman Rockwell image is, to be sure, part of the heroic domain of the First 
Amendment,129 standing alone it is too idealistic to do the real work of the 
Madisonian guaranty.  In the rough-and-tumble free speech world, such 
idealism, as I have suggested above, works to diminish the domain of the 
First Amendment. 
 
 128.  See Phillip Sipiora, Editor’s Preface, in NORMAN MAILER, MIND OF AN OUTLAW: 
SELECTED ESSAYS xvii (Phillip Sipiora ed., 2013) (stressing the value of continually adjusting 
one’s beliefs); Ronald K.L. Collins, Mailer’s Resistance—A Little Lesson in Free Speech, 8 THE 
MAILER REV. 92 (2014). 
 129.  Some adherents of the Rockwell heroic standard take a dim view of less respectable 
figures as candidates for heroic free speech designation.  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Lives in the 
Law: The Heroes of the First Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2118 (2003) (dismissing the idea of 
Lenny Bruce, the ribald comedian, as a First Amendment hero). 
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What, then, to do with the need for great precision and for due attention 
to context?  Here again, I think a presumption in favor of speech is key.  That 
presumption can be overcome by some showing of actual or imminent harm 
of a significant nature.  Beyond that, it is not the province of courts to 
constrict free expression rights based on Platonic-like norms of behavior that 
dictate our understanding of the First Amendment.  Even so, some 
contextualists might argue that cases such as Reno v. ACLU130 sweep too far 
in safeguarding sexual expression or in giving the impression that such 
speech might be protected when it fact it is not.  They might likewise insist 
on qualifying Justice Steven’s declaration that the “interest in encouraging 
freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but 
unproven benefit of censorship.”131  Good rhetoric, but bad law, they might 
claim.  Moreover, they might point to the excesses that have arisen post-Reno 
insofar as patently obscene materials, in contravention of Miller v. 
California’s132 standards, are the daily fare on the Internet. 
Is there a problem here?  I think not.  For the First Amendment is more 
than what judges say; it is also what people do133—that day-in and day-out 
exercise of unabridged freedom not beholden to elevated notions of the 
proper kinds of speech worthy of protection.  Such expression needs no 
HIGH VALUE justification to exist; its existence is its justification, at least 
presumptively so.  As the Internet obscenity illustration exemplifies, the 
culture of the First Amendment may well exceed the law of the First 
Amendment.  And if it does (owing to what lawmakers and prosecutors 
decline to do), then that is part of the domain of America’s modern liberty.  
Remember: There are societal costs to such freedom134—the vulgarians and 
their bunch have their tasteless ways.  Admittedly, America is not as pristine 
as it once was.  Here again, that is the culture of the First Amendment—
vibrant though sometimes course, robust though sometimes upsetting, and 
full-bodied though sometimes extreme. 
 
Will the law of the First Amendment ever venture as far down the paths 
as I have suggested?  Not entirely—most people are too beholden to the play-
it-safe and play-it-by-my-norms mentality.135  Nonetheless, there are 
 
 130.  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 131.  Id. at 885. 
 132.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 133.  See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 199–215 
(1992) (discussing cultural approach to the First Amendment). 
 134.  See supra text accompanying notes 97-99. 
 135.  Again—and it cannot be repeated too often—the First Amendment represents a radical 
break from that mindset. 
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promising signs; we tend ever more in the direction of free speech 
freedom.136  In the scheme of societal things, that movement may be 
reversible in a slight way or more.137  After all, the future is a wild card.  Still, 
as a nation we have progressed so far down the path of free speech liberty 
that I doubt that our momentous movement is stoppable.  As far as I know, 
never before in the history of humankind has such a wide swath of 
communicative freedom existed, either constitutionally or culturally. 
Meanwhile, holdover followers of the Congregation of the Index busily 
rounded up gay pride protestors several years ago in Putin’s Russia, this as 
they strove to again jail members of the punk rock group Pussy Riot for 
dissing the Great Vladimir.138  On the morality side of the political equation, 
in “modern” Saudi Arabia “The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and 
the Prevention of Vice” (the official enforcer of Sharia) still keeps a watchful 
eye on how women express themselves in public.139  True, it shocks us, as 
well it should.  And the reason it does is because such censorship is, literally 
speaking, foreign to us as free Americans.  Yes, we allow excesses; yes, we 
permit a degree of abuse; yes, we permit a big dollop of sexual license in 
movies; yes, we approve of citizens taking liberties with the reputations of 
public servants; yes, we suffer hate speech; and yes, we take our chances 
when we tolerate as much as we do in the name of free speech freedom.  All 
right, let us admit it.  But it is just that American outlook that situates us on 
 
 136.  Some seem to consider this disturbingly problematic.  See Frederick Schauer, First 
Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 175, 
194–196 (Lee Bollinger & Geoffrey Stone eds., 2002) (stressing the purported necessity of the 
“essence” of the First Amendment or its “antecedent” normative core in order to prevent its 
“misapplication”).  But cf. id. at 195–196 (noting that “in the final analysis none of the justifications 
for a distinct free-speech principle is sound,” thus allowing for the possibility of “arguments for a 
broader liberty”). 
 137.  Consider, for example, the diminution of student free speech rights.  See DAVID L. 
HUDSON, JR., LET THE STUDENTS SPEAK!: A HISTORY OF THE FIGHT FOR FREE EXPRESSION 
(Christopher Finan ed., 2011); GREG LUKIANOFF, UNLEARNING LIBERTY: CAMPUS CENSORSHIP 
AND THE END OF AMERICAN DEBATE (2013). 
 138.  See Zack Ford, Russian Police Arrest 60 Pride Protesters As Putin Signs Anti-Gay 
Censorship Bill Into Law, THINK PROGRESS (July 1, 2013) http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2013/07/ 
01/2238181/russian-police-arrest-60-pride-protesters-as-putin-signs-anti-gay-censorship-bill-into-
law/; Agence France Presse, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Pussy Riot Member, ‘Transferred To 
Siberia’, HUFF. POST (Nov. 5, 2013) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/05/nadezhda-
tolokonnikova-siberia_n_4217448.html.  See also David Herszenhorn, Released Punk Rockers 
Keep Up Criticism of Putin, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2013) http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest 
/2013/12/23/pussy_riot_release_punk_protesters_slam_amnesty_as_hoax_lie.html (“We didn’t 
ask for any pardon,” Ms. Alyokhina said.  “I would have sat here until the end of my sentence 
because I don’t need mercy from Putin.”). 
 139.  See Katherine Zoepf, Shopgirls: The Art of Selling Lingerie, NEW YORKER, Dec. 23 & 
30, 2013 at 58, 60. 
06 COLLINS (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2017  1:42 PM 
270 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 45:2 
a world stage radically different from Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, 
Germany, and even England and Canada. 
Though there is dissension (particularly in the legal academy), our 
system of freedom of expression stands.  Happily, demands to call a 
constitutional convention or amend the First Amendment have gone 
nowhere.140  But time can change minds.  For example, one of my dear 
friends and a renowned free speech scholar wrote a book titled What’s Wrong 
with the First Amendment.141  Steve Shiffrin is his name, and I owe a great 
deal of my formative education on the First Amendment to him.  That said, 
we do part company (for now, at least) at various intersections of free speech 
jurisprudence.  In his book, Professor Shiffrin contests much of today’s 
speech protective wisdom when it comes to matters such as privacy,142 race 
hate speech, commercial expression, campaign financing, and pretrial 
proceedings, among others.  If I dismissed this out of hand, I could only do 
so by betraying all I cherish about the First Amendment.  Shiffrin’s thoughts, 
however provocative, deserve a full and fair hearing in the courtroom of our 
minds.143  In that venue there can be no heretics, even when it comes to the 
First Amendment.  For all I know, Professor Shiffrin’s book may win over 
minds; it may turn the tide away from much of today’s libertarian-like 
thinking about the First Amendment.  It may, in short, upset the very things 
I hold dear in my current understanding of what free speech in America is or 
should be about.  Well, we take our chances—who knows, my old friend 
may even persuade me . . . or, then again, he may further embolden my 
current views.  That, at any rate, is a chance one must take if one truly 
believes in free speech.  The lesson: Nothing is certain here.  Take heed! 
 
 140.  See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID SKOVER, WHEN MONEY SPEAKS: THE 
MCCUTCHEON CASE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 189–92 (2014) 
(discussing the call by Lawrence Lessig for a constitutional convention); Moveon.org (re 
constitutional amendment). 
 141.  Cambridge University Press published the book in 2016.  See Ronald K.L. Collins, FAN 
93 (First Amendment News) ‘What’s Wrong with the First Amendment?’—Steve Shiffrin Book 
Coming This Summer, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 23, 2016), http://concurringopinions.com/ 
archives/2016/01/fan-93-first-amendment-news-whats-wrong-with-the-first-amendment-steve-shi 
ffrin-book-coming-this-summer.html. 
 142.  Of course, nothing that I say herein is intended to deny real harms caused by certain types 
of invasion of privacy followed by public dissemination.  See, e.g., Carrie Goldberg, It’s Clear: 
Creating Amateur Porn Without a Participant’s Knowledge is Illegal in NY, CONCURRING 
OPINIONS (July 16, 2014), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/07/carrie-goldberg-
its-clear-creating-amateur-porn-without-a-participants-knowledge-is-illegal-in-ny.html#more-89 
052.  See also DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014). 
 143.  See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, FAN 40 (First Amendment News) Steve Shiffrin & Bob 
Corn-Revere debate “What’s Wrong with the First Amendment?” CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov. 
12, 2014), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/11/fan-40-first-amendment-news-steve-
shiffrin-bob-corn-revere-debate-whats-wrong-with-the-first-amendment.html. 
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To be a free people is to take risks.  We cannot have genuine liberty if 
we clutch to safety like children terrified of the dark.  Free speech scholars 
may frighten us with the sky-is-falling scenarios while contextualist 
balancers echo that theme in opposition to reaffirmations of free speech 
freedom.  In that world censors tempt us with promises of security.  But in 
the end, it is too often a false promise.  For little worth safeguarding is truly 
gained if liberty is the altar on which such sacrifices are made.  Brandeis had 
it right: The First Amendment was made for a courageous people.144  And to 
be courageous means taking risks, which in turn sometimes means forsaking 
the security of collective certainty.  Or as Galileo so well phrased it: “In 
questions of science, the authority of a thousand is not worth the humble 
reasoning of a single individual.”145  Despite its romantic tenor, such an 
insight might serve us well not only in matters of science, but also in matters 
of life and law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 144.  See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 145.  GERARD PIEL, THE AGE OF SCIENCE: WHAT SCIENTISTS LEARNED IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 21 (2001) (quoting Galileo). 
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